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BALANCING PRIVACY AND THE  OPEN COURT  PRINCIPLE  
IN  FAMILY  LAW:  DOES DE-IDENTIFY ING CASE  LAW  
PROTECT  ANONYMITY?  
Sujoy Chatterjee* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the right to privacy in the context of family law cases. In 
balancing the open court principle against the right of the individual to  
remain anonymous, it is argued that there is a greater public good in main-
taining transparency of the judicial process. Disclosing the personal details of 
individuals who use the public court system allows the public to hold the  
judiciary accountable for their decisions. While advocates for greater privacy 
would argue that the personal details of litigants have no bearing on the legal 
rules that emerge from cases, landmark decisions such as Murdoch v  
Murdoch and Pettkus v Becker demonstrate how these same details colour the 
facts and allow for greater empathy and public activism. This is especially rel-
evant where citizens feel that the courts have made a wrong decision. While 
preserving anonymity is important to protect vulnerable parties such as chil-
dren, it is difficult from a technical standpoint to maintain anonymity for 
those involved in public proceedings. The widespread availability of personal 
information online, coupled with the expansion of online case law databases, 
facilitates the identification of individual litigants, even if case law is anony-
mized. Anonymizing family law cases by default is therefore a moot exercise 
that should not expand beyond the need to protect vulnerable individuals. 
Citation: (2014) 23 Dal J Leg Stud 91. 
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“In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape have full swing.  
Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks, applicable to judi-
cial injustice, operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice…1 Publicity 
is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all 
guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.”2  
—Jeremy Bentham  
Introduction 
Every year, thousands of family law litigants attend court to have their cases heard 
by judges. It is a process legitimized by allowing public scrutiny of the bench, including 
a judge’s ability to uphold civic values and the legal rights of citizens. As Bentham’s 
passage suggests, transparency is essential to this process—the open court principle 
underpins public disclosure within the justice system and is a crucial element of judicial 
transparency.3 In the family law context, the open court principle often involves expos-
ing the private details of family affairs. Allegations of abuse, adultery, and parental 
neglect can be raised in statements of claim, regardless of the truth.4 Personal infor-
mation such as parties’ names, dates of birth, account statements, and residential 
addresses are submitted to courts for cataloguing and evidentiary purposes.5 Former 
federal Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart has identified the need for better priva-
cy protection in the judicial system and supports the anonymization of court 
documents.6 To date, Quebec is the only jurisdiction in Canada that anonymizes family 
law cases by default.7  
Although it may be uncomfortable for some to have their personal information ex-
posed in open court, privacy protection must be balanced against the need for public 
scrutiny. This is fundamentally a conflict between an individual’s right to privacy (rec-
ognized at common law under section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and the 
long-standing open court principle. Open courts, like privacy, are meant to protect 
citizens. They expose family law litigants to a public adjudication process in which more 
than the parties are being judged; the court process itself is held to account by a critical 
and inquiring public. 
In balancing these two principles, having a regime that anonymizes family law case 
names by default is neither practical nor desirable. With the advent of re-identification 
technology, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain anonymous data. Professor 
                                                                                                                                            
1 “Constitutional Code, Book II, ch XII, sect XIV” in J Bowring, ed, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published 
under the superintendence of John Bowring (Edinburgh, UK: Tait, 1843), vol 9 at 493.  
2 Ibid at 316.   
3 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report to Parliament: Report on the Privacy Act, (Ottawa: 
Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2008) at 26 [Privacy Act Report].  
4 John C Mayoue, Balancing Competing Interests in Family Law, 2d ed (Chicago: American Bar Association Section 
of Family Law, 2003) at 5. 
5 Fareen Jamal, “Anonymity in Family Courts: Stop Naming and Shaming” (July 2011) 22:5 Ontario Bar 
Association – Family Law Section at 1.  
6 Jennifer Stoddart, “Open Courts and Privacy: Privacy Law in Canada” (Remarks at the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia Education Seminar, November 11, 2009), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada <http://www.priv.gc.ca>. 
7 Colin LaChance, “Immoveable object meet irresistible force” (23 July 2012), online: Slaw 
<http://www.slaw.ca>. 
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Paul Ohm has demonstrated how limited information such as date of birth, address, and 
sex can be used to specifically identify individuals.8 Moreover, Murdoch v Murdoch serves 
as a poignant reminder of how the personal identity of litigants is vital to political activ-
ism, particularly as it relates to gender equality and property distribution after divorce.9 
The public disclosure of court proceedings provides an opportunity for citizen engage-
ment on matters before the Court. This is an important aspect of the dialogue that 
exists between Parliament and the judiciary.10  
In Canada, the right to privacy has been examined in both civil and criminal law 
contexts. Privacy principles from criminal law cases are relevant to family law because 
both fields frequently deal with vulnerable populations such as children or victims of 
crime. No matter what the context, anonymity is essential to the protection of these 
individuals.11 However, in the interest of maintaining a transparent legal system that 
facilitates social activism and holds judges accountable, courts should not anonymize 
family law cases by default.  
Situating the Discussion of Privacy and the Open Court Principle in the  
Digital Context 
“Quod non est in actis, non est in mundo”: (That which is not in the record does 
not exist).12 
The electronic availability of case law complicates the relationship between privacy 
and the open court principle. With many decisions now available online, there is virtual-
ly unlimited disclosure of personal information from court documents. Andrew 
Feldstein comments that court documents such as applications, sworn financial state-
ments, and affidavits can expose “an individual’s address, employment, banking, social 
insurance number, date of birth, and income tax information.”13 This serves as a verita-
ble gold mine of information that Feldstein suggests could be used for identity theft and 
fraud.14 The level of access to court information available today could not have been 
envisioned by an 18th century jurist who operated in a time where many could not read, 
let alone access court records. Thus, the privacy implications of ubiquitous electronic 
disclosure are in many ways yet to be discovered. 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Paul Ohm, “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization” (2010) 57 
UCLA L Rev 1701 at 1705.  
9 Murdoch v Murdoch, [1975] 1 SCR 423, 41 DLR (3d) 367 [Murdoch]. 
10 Peter W Hogg & Allison Bushnell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 35:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 76 at 77. 
11 Mayoue, supra note 4.  
12 Cornelia Vismann, “Out of File Out of Mind” in Wendy Hui-Kyong Chun & Thomas Keenan, eds, New 
Media, Old Media: A history and theory reader (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2006) at 97.  
13 Andrew Feldstein, “Open courts destroy privacy for divorcing spouses” The Province (11 June 2012), online: 
Markham Family Lawyers <http://www.separation.ca/pdfs/Open-courts-%20destroy-privacy-for-divorcing-
spouses.pdf>. 
14 Ibid. 
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Anonymization Does Not Necessarily Make Parties Anonymous 
At common law, the onus to prove that extraordinary circumstances justify a publi-
cation ban on particular court proceedings lies with those seeking the ban.15 This 
protection is used to maintain public confidence in the court system by several means. 
Firstly, it ensures that judicial decisions are exposed to public scrutiny. When a decision 
does not conform to public values, citizens have the right to be informed and to protest 
decisions of the court. Secondly, the judiciary maintains public confidence by sharing its 
decisions through a transparent and open process. Lastly, the open court principle al-
lows an ongoing opportunity for the general public to learn how the justice system 
operates and how the law is being applied on a daily basis.16 
The modern-day challenge in defending the open court principle is to retain the 
value of public scrutiny when information is much more accessible and capable of being 
manipulated for uses beyond public disclosure. Speaking for the majority in R v Legal 
Aid, Justice Woolf (then the Master of the Rolls and Records of the Chancery of Eng-
land) states that the open court principle: 
…enables the public to know that justice is being administered impartially. It 
can result in evidence becoming available which would not become available 
if the proceedings were conducted behind closed doors or with one or more 
of the parties’ or witnesses’ identity concealed. It makes uninformed and in-
accurate comment about the proceedings less likely. If secrecy is restricted to 
those situations where justice would be frustrated if the cloak of anonymity is 
not provided, this reduces the risk of the sanction of contempt having to be 
invoked, with the expense and the interference with the administration of 
justice that this can involve.17  
Maintaining anonymized data is an increasingly difficult task. Despite attempts to 
obscure personal information in court records, enough information is available in public 
records that the identities of most parties to a legal action can be uncovered.18 In 2000, 
Professor Latanya Sweeney (then a Master’s student at MIT) showed how an anony-
mized data set could be “re-identified” using the voting records for the City of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, which contained only the sex, ZIP code, and birth date of 
each citizen in the data set.19 Sweeney found that “87.1 percent of people in the United 
States were uniquely identifiable by their combined five-digit ZIP code, birth date (in-
cluding year), and sex.”20 That is not a lot of information. It is the kind of information 
that is regularly volunteered on social media channels such as Facebook and LinkedIn. 
Additionally, consumers regularly provide their personal information to companies for 
promotional offers, advertising, product registration, and marketing purposes. Overlay-
ing this with the extensive data networks that gather and store this information 
demonstrates that it is fairly easy to put together a profile of an individual. Ontario 
Privacy Commissioner Ann Cavoukian argues that:  
                                                                                                                                            
15 Canadian Broadcasting Corp v New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 SCR 480 at para 71, 139 DLR (4th) 
385.  
16 Ibid. 
17 R v Legal Aid Board, ex parte Kaim Todner (a firm), [1999] QB 966 at para 4 CA (Eng). 
18 Ohm, supra note 8 at 1703.  
19 Ibid at 1719. 
20 Ibid at 1705.  
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In this day and age of 24/7 online expanded connectivity and immediate ac-
cess to digitized information, new analytic tools and algorithms now make it 
possible, not only to link a number with a name, but also to combine infor-
mation from multiple sources, ultimately creating an accurate profile of a 
personally identifiable individual.21 
The ease with which personal information can be aggregated from other sources 
and used to decipher court records may frustrate any protection offered by anonymizing 
court documents. To illustrate how much more careful legal professionals must be in 
using anonymized cases, consider D v D, a decision of the British Columbia Supreme 
Court involving a divorce in a very wealthy family. The court documents list the birth 
dates of both parties along with the names of their children and the date of divorce.22 
Combining this information with data similar to what Sweeney accessed for Cambridge, 
such as birth records for the parties’ municipality, the case can be effectively de-
anonymized with relative ease. The simple act of cross-referencing the facts of a case 
with public records defeats anonymity and the protection offered by it. Anonymity in 
family law matters is therefore challenged from a technical perspective in implementing 
a system that can be comprehensive in obscuring personal data. It is also challenged by 
the technological sophistication of information specialists who can use limited pieces of 
information to re-identify anonymized data.  
 The federal Privacy Commissioner has addressed the issue of de-identification and 
its ineffectiveness in anonymizing cases. In particular, the Commissioner found personal 
information that has been de-identified does not qualify as anonymous under the Person-
al Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) if it is still possible to link 
de-identified data to an identifiable individual.23 
When access to case law required physical presence at a law library or courtroom—
either to witness proceedings or to access court records—privacy was effectively pro-
tected by virtue of the public’s limited access. The online publication of decisions 
through various free legal databases has curtailed these limits in the interest of increas-
ing access to justice.24 The Free Access to Law Movement enables Internet users to 
access unprecedented amounts of legal information. With more than fifty member 
organizations, national legal databases such as CanLII provide quick access to case law, 
revealing the identities of parties involved in legal proceedings.25 Modern legal record 
keeping therefore provides a level of disclosure that goes beyond what is necessary to 
hold the judiciary accountable. Rather than placing the institution under a microscope, it 
is litigants who face the prospect of indefinite scrutiny, as these online records remain 
available long after a case is decided.26 Exploring Canada’s statutory framework and 
                                                                                                                                            
21 Ann Cavoukian, “Beware of ‘Surveillance by Design’”, The National Post (14 December 2011), online:  
Financial Post <http://business.financialpost.com>. 
22 D v D, [2008] BCSC 306 at 1, 51 RFL (6th) 334.  
23 PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-018, “Psychologist’s anonymized peer review notes are the personal  
information of the patient” (February 23 2009), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
<http://www.priv.gc.ca>. 
24 Jamal, supra note 5.  
25 Free Access to Law Movement, (2013), online: <http://www.fatlm.org>. 
26 Jennifer Stoddart, “The Open Court Principle and Privacy Legislation in the Digital Age” (Remarks at a 
Lunch-and-learn session on the de-identification of the decisions of labour tribunals and the protection of 
privacy in the 21st century, September 27, 2011), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
<http://www.priv.gc.ca>. 
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jurisprudence on anonymity rights explains how the open court principle has expanded 
its reach.  
Understanding Anonymity Rights in the Canadian Context 
Although there is no general right to anonymity in Canada, anonymity is under-
stood as a condition in which one’s identity is not connected to certain pieces of 
personal information.27 In this paper, anonymity is described as a function of the extent 
to which information, such as the names of parties, is redacted in court documents. 
Anonymity limits the accountability mechanism endorsed by the open court principle 
and denies citizens’ rights to fully witness the public court process.  
Establishing the Right to Privacy 
The right to privacy is a contested term that has been interpreted by many in the 
legal profession. Brandeis and Warren’s seminal piece entitled “The Right to Privacy” 
famously describe this as “the right to be left alone.”28 Legal scholars and judges alike 
have since built on this basic idea with theorists such as Parent indicating that the right 
to privacy includes the ability to control information about oneself.29 Meanwhile, 
Bloustein infuses notions of human dignity into the right to privacy by coupling the 
right with the principle of inviolate personality.30 He argues that the right to privacy 
includes the individual’s independence, dignity, and integrity.31 This is particularly rele-
vant in the family law context where deeply personal facts about human relations within 
a family are exposed for judgment by a third party.  
Although it is not formally enshrined in Canadian constitutional law, the genesis of 
the right to privacy stems from section 8 of the Constitution Act, 1982: “Everyone has the 
right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”32 The right to privacy in 
Canada arises from the Supreme Court decision in Hunter v Southam, which affirms that 
section 8 protects the individual from unreasonable search and seizure and that this 
section guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy.33 This means that the Charter 
guarantees a broad and general right that extends at least so far as to protect the right of 
privacy from unjustifiable state intrusion. In Southam, Dickson C.J. states that:  
Like the Supreme Court of the United States, I would be wary of foreclosing 
the possibility that the right to be secure against unreasonable search and sei-
                                                                                                                                            
27 Carole Lucock & Katie Black, “Anonymity and the Law in Canada” in Ian Kerr, Valerie Steeves & Carole 
Lucock, eds, Lessons from the Identity Trail (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 465.  
28 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193. 
29 WA Parent, “Privacy, Morality and the Law” (1983) 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 269 at 272.  
30 Edward J Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser” (1964) 39 
NYUL Rev 962 at 971. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Karon C Bales, “ Family Law and Estates” (Ontario Bar Association, Institute of Continuing Legal Educa-
tion delivered at Privacy Essentials – Tips, Traps and Hot Issues: Estate and Family Law, 23 January 2006) at 
2, [unpublished]; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 8, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.  
33 Hunter v Southam, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 160, 11 DLR (4th) 641 [Southam].  
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zure might protect interests beyond the right of privacy, but for purposes of 
the present appeal I am satisfied that its protections go at least that far.34 
Protection from state intrusion into privacy enables courts to disallow the collec-
tion of personal information by the state. Many section 8 cases such as Southam and R v 
Dyment analyze the boundaries of state authority in collecting personal information 
“based on the notion of the dignity and integrity of the individual.”35  
Family law operates within a particularly sensitive area of privacy law, as protection 
of privacy broadly encompasses activities that fall within the domestic sphere. As Pro-
fessor Jeannie Suk writes in At Home in the Law, “[the] home has been central to the 
articulation of constitutional rights, including the right against unreasonable search and 
seizure, the right to due process, the right to privacy, and (recently) the right to bear 
arms.”36 This is recognized in Canada where territorial privacy, especially as it relates to 
the home, is given a high degree of protection.37  
As a private place, the home can be conceptualized as not just the setting for family 
law issues, but also as a place for personal liberty, free from state intrusion. The purpose 
of the home is to act as a place of security. However, by recognizing the home as a 
private place and shielding it from public view, it can also become a site for abuse.38 
Both Suk and MacKinnon have argued that preventing intrusion upon seclusion and 
suggesting that people can function with impunity in the private sphere allows for dom-
ination, control, subjugation, and the obfuscation of abuse against women in the 
household.39 Thanks to individual Charter protections, including the right to security of 
the person, the household is not immune to prosecution; however, the unwillingness of 
domestic abuse victims to report their injuries means that many cases go unreported.40 
Although matters before the court are generally open, cases involving children or youth 
in child protection or adoption proceedings, the innocent in need of protection, and 
those who may be subject to harm are the main exceptions to this rule. Even with these 
exceptions, many others are unwilling or afraid to identify themselves. In this way, the 
open court principle paradoxically undermines justice by preventing people from speak-
ing up about their personal stories of abuse even as it is supposed to strengthen justice 
by making courts publicly accountable for their decisions. Even if one’s identity is 
anonymized, many are afraid to bring court challenges for fear of reprisal.41  
Analyzing the Open Court Principle 
The open court principle is a fundamental element of the common law system. It 
ensures the effectiveness of the evidentiary process while encouraging fair and transpar-
ent decision-making.42 The Privacy Act acknowledges the importance of maintaining the 
                                                                                                                                            
34 Ibid at 159. 
35 R v Dyment, [1988] 2 SCR 417 at para 22, 55 DLR (4th) 503.  
36 Jeannie Suk, At Home in the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) at 3. 
37 R v Tessling, [2004] 3 SCR 432 at para 22, 244 DLR (4th) 541.  
38 Catharine A MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989) at 
101. 
39 Suk, supra note 36 at 12.  
40 Ibid at 138.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Privacy Act Report, supra note 3. 
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open court principle as well as protecting the privacy of individuals. To this end, section 
8 of the Privacy Act, allows the disclosure of personal information without the consent 
of the individual in situations where the public interest clearly outweighs any invasion of 
privacy.43 
The open court principle serves as a means of disseminating information about the 
judicial process and therefore plays an important role in educating the public.44 The 
motivation behind such a policy is public confidence. Without confidence in the judicial 
system, court authority lacks legitimacy, and without legitimacy the rule of law would be 
diminished.45 
In the context of court proceedings, section 2(b) of the Charter serves as a central 
pillar for the open court principle. It protects freedom of expression, which empowers 
the press and other media to publicize court proceedings. So, for example, in Edmonton 
Journal v Alberta (Attorney General) the Supreme Court of Canada held that restricting the 
publication of matrimonial proceedings violated section 2(b) of the Charter. Crucially, 
Justice Wilson adopted a contextual approach in analyzing fundamental Charter rights.46 
In Ontario, section 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act allows a court to seal documents 
submitted in civil proceedings, treating them as confidential and exempt from the public 
record.47 The test for granting a publication ban on court proceedings and court records 
was developed at the Supreme Court through Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion.48 The test was later modified by R v Mentuck.49 The decision in Dagenais held that 
judges have the discretion to impose publication bans on information revealed in a 
criminal trial, however that right must be weighed against other rights, such as freedom 
of the press and the right to a fair trial.50 Mentuck modifies Dagenais by adding that a 
publication ban should only be ordered when it is necessary to prevent a serious risk to 
the proper administration of justice and that the salutary effects of the ban must out-
weigh the deleterious effects of publication.51  
Mentuck and Dagenais are murder cases. Some may challenge the need to anonymize 
case names in the family law context. Although family law cases do not often involve 
murder, they may involve extreme cases of both physical and psychological abuse. 
Anonymization helps to protect victims of this abuse.  
There is a Need to Maintain Anonymization when Children are the Central  
Focus of Family Law Cases  
There is little doubt that children should remain anonymous when the fallout from 
a court decision may affect them. The Supreme Court of Canada has made it easier to 
protect anonymity when children are involved with its decision in AB v Bragg Communica-
tions Inc. This case involved a challenge by the Halifax Herald and Global Television to a 
                                                                                                                                            
43 Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21, s 8(2)(m)(i). 
44 Beverley McLachlin, “Courts, Transparency and Public Confidence – To the Better Administration of 
Justice” (2003) 8(1) Deakin Law Review 1 at 6.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at para 1, 64 DLR (4th) 577.  
47 Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43, s 137(2). 
48 Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1994] 3 SCR 835, [1994] ACS No 104 [Dagenais]. 
49 R v Mentuck, [2001] 3 SCR 442, 205 DLR (4th) 512 [Mentuck]. 
50 Dagenais, supra note 48 at 838.  
51 Mentuck, supra note 49 at para 32.  
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publication ban sought by a 15-year-old victim of cyberbullying.52 The high school 
student was provided with the IP address of someone who had created a fake Facebook 
profile of her with disparaging remarks about her appearance, as well as intimate and 
sexually explicit comments.53 The media argued a publication ban would violate the 
open court principle. At trial, the court sided with AB, finding that AB had established a 
prima facie defamation case. However, the trial judge held that a publication ban would 
limit public awareness of cyberbullying, and that the public could not fully recognize the 
importance of this issue without full disclosure.54 So, the judge ordered a temporary 
publication ban until AB decided whether she would pursue an action for defamation, 
but AB had not shown that she would be specifically harmed by publication if the ac-
tion were to go forward. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision. By contrast, the 
Supreme Court was willing to assume that, because the subject matter involved children 
and children are in need of special protection by virtue of their chronology, the harm 
caused by cyberbullying could be objectively determined.55 As such, preserving anonym-
ity for children is only minimally intrusive on freedom of expression and AB was 
entitled to proceed anonymously.56  
Weighing the Costs and Benefits of the Open Court Principle 
“The first cost of the open court principle is to privacy.”  
—Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin57 
By exposing the private details of individuals to court, the open court principle cre-
ates the potential to violate informational privacy. As early as 2003, the Canadian 
Judicial Council highlighted how personal information listed on public court documents 
may be used for identity theft.58 There is also the potential for discrimination or bias 
against parties involved in family law cases. Anyone interested in searching for court 
documents related to an individual (whether a potential employer, client, or member of 
the public at large) can do so by visiting the court records office in person or by search-
ing online via CanLII or courthouse databases. In this sense, the open court principle 
threatens an individual’s privacy; yet having an open court is the cornerstone for public 
law because public access allows oversight of the judicial process. As Justice Fish stated 
in Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Ontario, “In every constitutional climate, the administra-
tion of justice thrives on exposure to light—and withers under a cloud of secrecy.”59 It 
is through the open court principle that the public gains confidence in the integrity of 
the court system. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court gives privacy a quasi-
                                                                                                                                            
52 AB v Bragg Communications Inc, 2012 SCC 46 at para 1, [2012] 2 SCR 567.  
53 Ibid at para 2.  
54 Ibid at para 5. 
55 Ibid at para 9.  
56 Ibid at para 28. 
57 McLachlin, supra note 44 at 2. 
58 Canadian Judicial Council, Judges Technology Advisory Committee, “Discussion Paper: Open Courts, 
Electronic Access to Court Records, And Privacy” (2003) at 30, online: Canadian Judicial Council 
<http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca>.  
59 Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Ontario, 2005 SCC 4 at para 1, [2005] 2 SCR 188.  
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constitutional status in Southam, where Dickson J. says the purpose of section 8 of the 
Charter is “to protect individuals from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy.”60  
This exposes a fundamental tension between privacy and the open court principle: 
how can there be protection for an individual’s privacy when the open court principle 
requires “justice to be seen to be done?”61 
Private Matters in Public View 
This tension comes to the fore in family law where it is often necessary to expose 
detailed personal information in order to establish rights to child custody, property, and 
support payments for separating spouses. In an era where online access to court deci-
sions is ubiquitous, there are concerns that disclosing personal information in court 
exposes the individual to identity theft. Moreover, it is an unanticipated consequence of 
divorce that what was said in confidence in the context of a marriage is now exposed to 
the public. The public exposure of such information can be embarrassing and wide-
spread. For example, Vic Toews, the former Minister for Public Safety, learned this the 
hard way when details of his divorce were broadcast on Twitter after a Liberal Party 
staff member requested access to his 2008 divorce file.62  
Some judges in Ontario have used the open court principle to illustrate how liti-
gants are using court resources imprudently. For example, in Bruni v Bruni Justice Quinn 
demonstrates the limits of a court’s patience for families with chronic legal issues. De-
spite numerous appearances in family court, the litigants in Bruni were so far from a 
resolution that the judge resorted to ridicule in order to embarrass them and dissuade 
them from returning to court.63 Some choice words from the proceeding include Justice 
Quinn stating, “Here, a husband and wife have been marinating in a mutual hatred so 
intense as to surely amount to a personality disorder requiring treatment. The source of 
difficulties is hatred: a hardened, harmful, high-octane hatred.”64 Owing to his disap-
pointment with both sides in this affair, Justice Quinn awarded sole custody to the 
mother, with the stipulation that she should receive only $1.00 in annual spousal sup-
port.65 This story was the subject of significant commentary in Toronto’s legal 
community. It raises awareness about the behaviour of some individuals and how judges 
may respond by publicly disclosing this behaviour. While it is true that knowing the 
names of the individuals in this case adds no value to the legal decision, there may be 
some benefit to lawyers and their clients in knowing that improper conduct in the 
courtroom can follow a person well beyond their civil action.  
Although it may be unsettling to have such intimate details surface in a public 
courtroom, courts have been reluctant to grant anonymity on the grounds of parties 
suffering embarrassment, shame, or humiliation.66  
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Indeed, sensitive issues are brought to light through the public justice system and 
provide the traditional justification for the open court principle as a means of exposing 
injustice and driving social reform in family law.  
Political Activism and the Courts: Are Anonymous Records an Alphabet 
Soup?  
Advocates for anonymization argue that the disclosure of litigants’ identities, as 
well as that of their families, should be limited in order to secure privacy in family law 
cases. For instance, they argue family courts should use initials and pseudonyms as a 
universal standard based on the principle that records should only reveal as much in-
formation as necessary for a judge to make a determination.67  
Even if there is some limited protection for individuals by anonymizing court cases, 
there are administrative challenges in implementing an anonymized system. Since family 
law deals with issues such as property division and child custody, it lists identifiable 
information within court records including location, date of marriage, and birth dates 
for spouses and children. Anonymization would offer some limited protection for  
family law litigants only if it is comprehensive in removing all identifiers from court 
documents. With the volume of information present in most family law cases, there is a 
high likelihood that personal data that should be obscured could be missed.  
In Quebec, family law cases are anonymized by replacing party names with letters 
such as A v B followed by a catalogue number.68 Lawyers, librarians, students, and  
judges have to be exceedingly careful in how they cite cases that have been anonymized. 
With similarly named, de-identified case law, this could lead to more mistakes by legal 
professionals as they navigate the already complicated task of legal research.69  
However, as evidenced by Becker and Murdoch, there are public benefits in personal-
izing the style of cause. While there is a cost in terms of the privacy afforded to 
individuals who use the court system, the cost is insufficient to justify a right to ano-
nymity by default since such a right does not exist either by statute or under the 
common law.  
There is a reason why names such as Pettkus v Becker and Murdoch v Murdoch are 
etched into the memories of family lawyers and law students alike. Pettkus v Becker estab-
lishes the constructive trust as a remedy for spouses lacking title to property.70 
Unfortunately, it is also infamous for the tragic suicide of Rosa Becker, which exposed 
the ineffectiveness of the courts in enforcing orders for payment by a recalcitrant 
spouse.71 In her suicide note, Rosa Becker explained that her death was a protest against 
an unfair legal system which had “deprived her of justice and left her penniless.”72 Becker 
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highlights how personal stories are inter-woven within the facts of a case; they add 
substance to the legal principles established by law. The names Rosa Becker and Lothar 
Pettkus helped to personalize this tragic story, which meant that the public could empa-
thize with the injustice that Rosa Becker felt. Had the parties been anonymous, it is 
questionable to what extent the public would empathize with the tragic case of A in “A 
v B,” particularly when such anonymization is unlikely to be unique in identifying family 
cases.  
Unlike most areas of law, family law requires the disclosure of personal details re-
vealing the conduct and character of disputing parties. In Murdoch v Murdoch, public 
outrage at the Supreme Court’s decision to deny a wife’s property claim permeated 
communities across Canada. As Professor Mary Jane Mossman explains, “…Irene Mur-
doch’s case became a cause célèbre when some women in Manitoba created a skit about 
the case, demonstrating wives’ lack of legal entitlement to property. The skit was repro-
duced and circulated for performance by women’s groups in many parts of Canada…”73 
Had there been no public disclosure of the manner in which Mrs. Murdoch was victim-
ized, the changes in the area of unjust enrichment and constructive trusts may have 
been long delayed. Instead, attaching a name and a face to the injustice propelled the 
issue of women’s property rights to the forefront of 20th century Canadian jurispru-
dence. This is a central function of the open court principle that many privacy advocates 
overlook.  
Family Law: A Constant Target for Judicial Reform  
“…we must concentrate our efforts on the specific areas of law with the greatest so-
cietal need and where we can have the highest impact. It is for this reason that I 
continue to advocate for ongoing family law reform.”  
—Former Chief Justice of Ontario, Warren Winkler74 
The cases cited above are well over 30 years old, which raises the question as to 
whether public disclosure is still relevant to contemporary issues in family law. Argua-
bly, public disclosure is necessary in family law because family law is a regular object of 
legal reform in Canada. For instance, disclosure was central to Professor John  
McCamus’ landmark 1994 report in Ontario, which criticized how family law narrowly 
focused on the interests of married couples, rather than those of common law and 
cohabiting spouses.75 At the turn of the century, law reform in Nova Scotia also placed 
heavy emphasis on family law issues such as enforcement of spousal and child mainte-
nance obligations.76 More recently in 2011, the province of Nova Scotia asked its 
residents for feedback on legal reforms that would help ensure that families experienc-
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ing divorce and separation would have clear laws governing child custody and access.77 
Thus, discussions of legal reform in Canada consistently focus on family law and how 
the system can be more equitable to family law litigants.  
Access to justice issues in family law offer at least a partial explanation as to why 
family law features so consistently as a target for reform. Canadian Lawyer magazine 
reports that the vast majority of unrepresented clients arise from family law cases.78 The 
cost of legal services is an obvious barrier to prospective family law litigants as there are 
often unequal parties bargaining for rights to custody of children and property owner-
ship. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) serves as a very attractive option for family 
law litigants, offering a less costly, and perhaps more co-operative means of civil dispute 
resolution. However, Professor Trevor Farrow cites concerns about ADR processes 
because of their private nature. As a starting point, private dispute resolution methods 
do not allow for the development of jurisprudence in a particular area of law.79 Clients, 
lawyers, and mediators hold whatever resolution parties arrive at in confidence.  
Bentham’s words—“In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape 
have full swing”—still hold some truth.80 ADR takes privacy one step further than mere 
anonymity because the entire process is confidential. As more individuals turn to private 
dispute resolution instead of the courts for family law matters, any inequity remains 
hidden from public view. This is particularly troublesome since wealthy individuals are 
able to shield themselves from public scrutiny by pursuing private dispute resolution. 
The result is that the public loses the ability to debate serious family law issues because 
they have no way of knowing what issues arise in the first place. This in turn diminishes 
the prospect of meaningful reform in family law where it is so desperately needed. Ano-
nymity impoverishes the narrative in family law cases despite the need for a compelling 
story to elicit civic action and eventual reform in family law.  
Where Does Dissent Come From?  
Murdoch is interesting not only for its social activism, but also for the dissent of Jus-
tice Laskin (as he then was) where he argues for a constructive trust in favour of  
Mrs. Murdoch.81 During Laskin’s tenure at the Supreme Court of Canada, judges would 
frequently write dissenting opinions. Under Chief Justice McLachlin, however, dissent is 
not nearly as common. For this reason, hers has been called the “consensus-driven 
court” with more of its members agreeing than any other composition in recent histo-
ry.82 Unanimous decisions are commonplace and suggest a dearth of critical thought on 
the bench. Today the Supreme Court acts less as a check on power and more like a 
government advisor. Regardless of one’s politics, this is a fundamentally different role 
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for courts than the one they have traditionally served.83 As Professor Jamie Cameron 
observes, “The evolution of the Charter has slowed right down,” at least in the sense 
that lower courts are less likely to innovate if the top court is not also doing so.84 With 
the number of appeals to the Supreme Court declining, The Globe and Mail reports that 
“many lawyers question whether the Court is dodging some of the tougher, but more 
significant, cases.”85 
The concern is that if members of the bench are not driving dissent, then that res-
ponsibility falls to the public. This is one reason why public disclosure in court cases is 
particularly important today. An informed public that knows the names, backgrounds, 
and socio-economic conditions of the people involved in family court cases will be 
better equipped to critique a particular court decision in the hope of creating real social 
change. The law is so often a vehicle for oppressing the rights of those who do not have 
the resources to advance their claims to the highest court, or for privileging the rights of 
those who do. Public disclosure is one of the last defenses to such oppression.  
Conclusion 
The open court principle legitimizes the judicial process by exposing decisions to 
public debate. There is an obvious tension between an individual’s right to privacy and 
maintaining an open system that allows the public to question a judge’s thought process 
in rendering a decision. It must be acknowledged that the open court principle needs to 
be tempered by the right to privacy, which has been interpreted as falling under section 
8 of the Charter. It is a judge’s responsibility to ensure that vulnerable members of socie-
ty such as children, victims of crime, and witnesses are protected from exposure. This is 
because there are serious consequences in exposing personal information about individ-
uals that use the public court system. 
However, public disclosure has also facilitated political activism, prompting mean-
ingful legal reform. In the context of family law, leading cases such as Murdoch and 
Becker have highlighted the social inequities arising between men and women. Disclosing 
the identities of those involved in such cases helps humanize the legal issues and to 
generate momentum for change. In an era where justices of the Supreme Court are 
increasingly in agreement and approach difficult legal issues with a consensus-building 
model, there is a greater need for public activism; knowing the personal stories behind 
legal cases gives citizens ammunition as they advocate for change.  
It is also important to recognize that privacy advocates are correct in calling for 
greater protection of personal information pertaining to the financial assets, home ad-
dresses, and names of children mentioned in family law cases. However, with the advent 
of digital record keeping and the ability to connect disparate pieces of an individual’s 
online identity, courts face an uphill battle in protecting this information. The judiciary 
is ill-equipped to tackle the sophisticated means of re-identifying information available 
to the public and so calls for anonymizing individuals involved in family law cases may 
be a lost cause. Use of the judicial system, as with any public institution, comes at the 
price of personal liberty in the interest of maintaining the system’s integrity. 
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